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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3997 
___________ 
 
ISRAEL JACOB TORRES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECURITY CAPTAIN T. P. CLARK; 
SUPERINTENDENT MIKE WENEROWICZ; 
S. K. KEPHART, Correctional Classification Program Manager 
HEARING EXAMINER SHARON LUQUIS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-01323) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 7, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: April 9, 2013) 
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PER CURIAM 
 Israel Torres, a Pennsylvania state inmate, filed a pro se civil rights complaint 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court, alleging violations of his First, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights by various prison officials at the State Correctional 
Institute at Frackville (“SCI-Frackville”).1
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard as the District Court.  Pichler v. 
UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008).  Summary judgment is appropriate if the 
record reveals “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Because we agree with the District 
Court that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment, we will affirm. 
  The defendants moved for summary 
judgment, which the District Court granted.  Torres timely filed this appeal. 
I. 
 In March 2010, the Security Office at SCI-Frackville intercepted an outgoing letter 
from Torres which contained disparaging, profanity-laced statements about Correctional 
Officer Michael Blankenhorn, who worked in the Security Office and had previously 
issued Torres a misconduct report for attempting to use the mail system to send gang-
related correspondence to other inmates.  The letter concluded with the statement “[i]f 
[Blankenhorn] keeps acting like he is above policy/law somebody is going to break his 
                                              
1 After filing his complaint, Torres was transferred to SCI-Forest.  He was later 
transferred to SCI-Rockview, where he is presently confined. 
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jaw is what I assume?!”  Captain T.P. Clark, who headed the Security Office, issued 
Torres a misconduct report charging him with (1) threatening an employee with bodily 
harm; and (2) using abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language to an employee. 
Torres pleaded not guilty at the misconduct hearing, arguing (1) the letter’s 
concluding statement was not intended as a threat against Blankenhorn but rather an 
expression of frustration about prison life; and (2) the letter’s remaining references to 
Blankenhorn did not constitute using abuse, obscene, or inappropriate language to an 
employee because Torres believed the letter would only be read by its intended recipient.  
Hearing Examiner Sharon Luquis found that Torres knew that Blankenhorn would read 
the letter because Blankenhorn had previously issued him a misconduct report after 
screening one of his earlier outgoing letters, and that the statement about Blankenhorn 
having his jaw broken was intended as a threat.  She accordingly found Torres guilty of 
the charges in the misconduct report and sanctioned him to an additional 90 days 
confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”), where he was already serving time 
for multiple previous misconducts.2
                                              
2 Torres received 60 days for threatening an employee with bodily harm, and 30 days for 
the charge of using abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language to an employee. 
  Following the hearing, Torres was transferred to a 
cell within the RHU known as the T-Cell, which is designed for use as both a security-
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based transition cell and a psychiatric observation cell.  Torres was confined in the T-Cell 
for approximately six days before being returned to a standard cell within the RHU.3
Torres filed an administrative appeal from the misconduct hearing, claiming that 
Clark had issued him the misconduct report in retaliation for writing disparaging 
statements about Blankenhorn.  Torres also filed a grievance, reiterating the retaliation 
claim against Clark and further asserting that the decision to place him in the T-Cell was 
retaliatory.  Torres also challenged the conditions of the T-Cell, claiming that he was 
forced to sleep on a hard plastic slab instead of a mattress, resulting in lower back pain, 
and that the 24-hour lighting in the cell caused him to suffer from vision problems and 
sleep deprivation.  The Hearing Review Committee sustained the misconduct and the 
Grievance Coordinator rejected Torres’s grievance.  His appeals of those decisions to 
Superintendent Michael Wenerowicz were unsuccessful.  Thereafter, Torres filed the 
instant complaint pursuant to § 1983 in the District Court. 
 
II. 
 Torres’s complaint first advanced retaliation claims against Clark and Luquis, 
arguing that Clark issued him the misconduct report and that Luquis placed him in the T-
Cell in retaliation for his letter’s disparaging statements about Blankenhorn.  With respect 
to the misconduct report’s charge that the letter’s concluding statement constituted a 
                                              
3 During his time in the T-Cell, Torres was seen by a nurse after complaining of back 
pain, vision problems, and dandruff.  He was subsequently seen by a physician, to whom 
he complained about dandruff problems.  The physician prescribed a dandruff shampoo. 
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threat against Blankenhorn, we agree with the District Court that the statement is not 
constitutionally protected because it is a “true threat.”  See Watts v. United States, 394 
U.S. 705, 707 (1969); United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Because the statement is not constitutionally protected, Torres cannot rely on it as the 
basis for a retaliation claim.  See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  With 
respect to the misconduct report’s charge that other statements in Torres’s letter 
constituted the use of abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language towards Blankenhorn, 
we agree with the District Court that these statements plainly violated the prison’s 
permissible restriction on Torres’s First Amendment rights and therefore cannot form the 
basis for a retaliation claim.  See Cowans v. Warren, 150 F.3d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 580 (7th Cir. 1986).  We are also unconvinced by 
Torres’s claim that the decision to place him in the T-Cell was retaliatory.  We agree with 
the District Court that because the defendants were familiar with Torres’s history of 
persistent attempts to circumvent prison policies in order to send unauthorized, gang-
related correspondence to other inmates, there were substantial reasons to temporarily 
place him in the security-based transition cell following the hearing. 
Torres’s complaint also alleged that Luquis violated his due process rights by 
denying him the opportunity to question Clark at the misconduct hearing and by failing to 
provide adequate process prior to placing him in the T-Cell.  However, because Torres 
did not exhaust these claims during his administrative appeals of the misconduct 
proceeding, they are procedurally defaulted for purposes of his § 1983 action.  See Spruill 
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v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2004).  Finally, Torres’s complaint advanced 
Eighth Amendment claims based on his six-day confinement in the T-Cell.  We agree 
with the District Court that Torres has not alleged facts sufficient to establish an Eighth 
Amendment violation based on the conditions of his confinement in the T-Cell, see 
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1991); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 
1997), or based on the medical attention he received there, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97 (1976); Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). 
III. 
For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
